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How necessary are randomized controlled trials? 
 
 
Abstract 
Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are often deemed the gold standard for testing new 
treatments. This belief in turn justifies recruiting patients into such trials even when it is 
suspected that a new treatment is superior – although patients in the control group are 
thereby denied what might be the better treatment, we cannot know that the treatment 
actually is better, the thought runs, without conducting an RCT. 
But Robert Northcott argues that RCTs are not always the best choice after all. 
Rather, like any other method, they can go wrong sometimes, in several different ways. 
The main alternative to them is historical studies, which try to assess a treatment‟s 
effectiveness from data not drawn from trials. These too can go wrong in several ways, 
and in the past have acquired a bad reputation. However, that prejudice has become 
outdated. The truer picture, Northcott argues, is that sometimes one method is preferable, 
sometimes the other. Things must be decided case by case. It follows that the ethical 
ramifications of conducting an RCT also must be examined case by case; there is no one-
size-fits-all answer. 
An especially striking and emotional example concerns ECMO, a treatment for 
newborn babies with life-threatening lung problems. Historical studies indicated that 
ECMO was a major breakthrough, offering hugely increased survival rates. But it was 
still insisted that it also be tested in RCTs, in the course of which many babies receiving 
the conventional treatment died. A properly nuanced view of RCTs suggests that these 
deaths were tragically unnecessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Historically, newborns with a form of respiratory failure called persistent pulmonary 
hypertension (PPHS) faced a mortality rate of more than 80 per cent. The main symptom 
is immaturity of the lungs, leading to poor oxygenation of the blood. Doctors seek 
desperately to keep the baby alive until the lungs mature. But recently it happened that 
suffering babies faced these terrible odds… when all along a new treatment that had 
recorded an 80 per cent survival rate was available but left unused. In particular, this 
occurred during several trials of the treatment known as extracorporeal membraneous 
oxygenation (ECMO). 
 
Developed in the late 1970s, ECMO in effect takes over the function of the lungs by 
withdrawing blood, oxygenating and then reheating it artificially, before finally returning 
it to the baby. Nevertheless, despite immensely promising initial results, the researchers 
behind ECMO felt that, in order to prove their therapy, they needed to conduct a 
randomized controlled trial (RCT) of it. Otherwise, they worried, the treatment would 
never gain general acceptance (Bartlett et al 1982). Is this how it should be? Are RCTs 
really the unique „gold standard‟ that should always trump other kinds of evidence? The 
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stakes are high. Of course, no one in this story wanted newborn babies to die 
unnecessarily. The dispute, rather, was a sincere one about how best to prove ECMO‟s 
effectiveness. 
 
As is well known, RCTs work roughly as follows: they randomly divide a trial sample 
into two groups, one of which (the „treatment group‟) receives the new treatment, the 
other of which (the „control group‟) receives only a placebo or the old treatment. 
Outcomes in the two groups are then compared. If the first group does better this is strong 
evidence in favor of the new treatment, because randomization is designed to ensure that 
the only relevant difference between the two groups – and hence the only possible 
explanation for the different outcomes – is the different treatments received. 
 
A common worry is that asking patients to participate in RCTs can be unethical, because 
often we have reason to believe that a new treatment is rather promising, in which case 
those in the control group are thereby being denied what is probably better care. Newborn 
babies being denied ECMO is an especially striking example. Are such unlucky patients 
being put at risk unjustifiably? The most powerful reply is that RCTs are the only way to 
establish secure knowledge of therapeutic effectiveness, and so in the long run it would 
be ethically disastrous to stymie medical progress by stopping them. Besides, advocates 
claim, until an RCT is carried out we cannot know for sure if a new treatment actually is 
better. 
 
Reconciling these two positions is often a nuanced matter. The vital underlying issue is 
the extent to which, in the absence of RCT evidence, a physician is entitled to judge one 
treatment more effective than another. That is, matters turn on something more properly 
located in philosophy of science than in bioethics – namely, to what extent are RCTs the 
indispensable best method for judging a treatment‟s effectiveness? 
 
Are RCTs special? 
When it comes to establishing whether a particular treatment causes better outcomes, 
there is plenty of common ground. Everyone agrees the ideal situation is to compare the 
effects of a treatment to the effects of the alternative, all else equal. The problem, of 
course, is that usually many things affect an outcome besides the treatment itself: the 
patient‟s age, general health, sex, how early their condition has been diagnosed, and so 
on. The key is to balance treatment and control groups with respect to „confounders‟, i.e. 
with respect to these other, potentially muddying factors. 
 
Across the sciences, there exist many methods for doing this besides RCTs. Perhaps the 
most famous is the simple controlled experiment with no randomization element. Another 
is the historical or observational study. These latter studies use data that do not come 
from experiments. As a result, those data must be selected with extra care so as to make 
due allowance for potential confounders and thus avoid being distorted. In the context of 
medicine, it is these historical studies that are especially controversial. In the past, they 
were often conducted poorly. Common problems included inconsistent diagnostic 
procedures and interpretation, uneven rates of hospitalization across groups, and 
difficulty in blinding data collection. For example, if patients in the past were diagnosed 
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less quickly, then superior outcomes today might reflect simply earlier diagnosis rather 
than anything special about new treatments. Overall, historical studies had a tendency to 
overestimate treatment effects (Chalmers et al 1983). Compared to this, the rigor of 
testing for new treatments today is rightly lauded, and RCTs are central to that. It is this 
record that has motivated many to insist on RCTs – and only RCTs – as the gold 
standard. 
 
However, recent work in philosophy of science casts doubt upon this insistence. To be 
sure, no one defends poorly conducted historical studies, let alone reliance on individual 
physicians‟ personal hunches. And no one denies that well run RCTs are often the most 
effective method, sometimes indeed perhaps the only available one. However, it is now 
argued, RCTs are not always best. First, techniques for running historical studies have 
improved enormously; great strides have been made in research design and in techniques 
for causal inference from statistics. Indeed, more recent analyses suggest that historical 
studies now perform equally as well as RCTs, and perhaps even better (Benson and Hartz 
2000, Concato et al 2000). Much turns out to depend on the specifics of each case: 
sometimes one method may be the superior choice, sometimes another. This is especially 
true when one also takes into account „external‟ considerations such as cost, timing or 
convenience. 
 
Moreover, plenty of other sciences have prospered without RCTs. And even within 
medicine, some of our most reliable and important knowledge has come from historical 
studies, formal and informal. Examples include: most surgical techniques, that smoking 
causes cancer, and that aspirin relieves headaches.  
 
Problems to be avoided 
There are several well known difficulties that efficiently conducted RCTs have proved 
effective at guarding against: 
-- Doctors might select only the most medically promising patients for the treatment 
group, which risks distorting the results. Or they might interpret a patient‟s symptoms 
differently depending on which group the patient is in. Avoiding these risks is the 
motivation for blinding a trial from physicians. 
-- If patients know they are in the treatment rather than control group it can affect how 
they self-report their outcomes, often relevant for instance with regard to psychiatric 
conditions. Avoiding this risk is the motivation for blinding a trial from patients. 
-- Generally, treatment and control groups can be imbalanced with respect to confounders 
both known and unknown. A randomized allocation seeks to head off this problem. 
(More on the issue of randomization shortly.) 
 
However, it is helpful also to be aware of several other difficulties that can lead even an 
RCT astray. Examples include: 
-- The patients recruited for a trial might be unrepresentative of the general population. 
For example, if a drug is especially effective only in one ethnic group but that ethnic 
group is under-represented in the trial, then this efficacy might well be missed. 
Observational studies are often more careful about matching the tested population with 
the wider eventual target population. 
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-- Not all patients signed up for a trial persevere with it. If the drop-outs are 
unrepresentative and are omitted from the final results, the trial can be skewed. For 
example, imagine testing a safe-sex program among sex workers: some of the subjects in 
the safe-sex treatment group will drop out rather than lose income. Those who drop out 
will likely not be typical, thus distorting the results. Again, such programs can often be 
assessed much better by using historical control groups rather than RCTs. 
-- A treatment might have positive effects on one sub-group but negative effects on 
another. A trial‟s overall results might then simply reflect the net balance between these 
two sub-groups, missing the individual effects. 
-- Mistaken units of analysis. For example, often an education program should allocate 
whole schools to treatment and control groups, not just classes or individuals. As a result, 
the effective sample size is number of schools, which is a much smaller number than 
number of classes or individuals. But analyses of such trial results might mis-state this. 
-- False negatives, i.e. when the effectiveness of a treatment is missed, perhaps because of 
small numbers or insensitive outcome measures. 
-- Problems with blinding and use of suitable placebo, meaning that bias is not controlled 
effectively. 
 
Of course, well designed RCTs try their best to counter these difficulties. And poorly 
conducted historical studies will also be vulnerable to many of them. The point is only 
that conducting an RCT is no guarantee – they too can go wrong.  
 
Some of these difficulties are especially likely to crop up when assessing social policy or 
public health interventions. As a result, in these domains observational studies are often 
not only more feasible than RCTs but actually give more accurate results too. It might be 
difficult to set up a useful RCT for a food policy program, for instance. But if we put 
weight only on RCTs, observational studies will inevitably be downgraded. As a result, 
the food program might be denied funding, even though it potentially has more impact on 
public health than most drug trials put together. That is, an over-emphasis on RCTs over 
all other methods risks unhealthily distorting which science is funded in the first place 
(Grossman and Mackenzie 2005). 
 
ECMO again 
Historical studies too, just like RCTs, need to avoid the various problems listed above. 
But sometimes they will. ECMO is a good example, for with that case there was good 
reason to trust the historical data. For instance, all newborns with PPHS were treated 
without exception; there was no ambiguity regarding the interpretation or reporting of 
outcomes; and there was no known muddying confounder, such as speed of diagnosis, 
correlated with the split of the historical sample between ECMO and conventional 
treatments. In sum, was not the established 80 per cent mortality rate for conventional 
treatment already a rigorous enough control group? And was not the 20 per cent mortality 
rate of the babies treated with ECMO already a rigorous enough treatment group? 
Moreover, the improvement in outcomes reported for ECMO was so huge that any 
confounding effect would have to have been correspondingly huge to nullify it. 
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The only element missing from the ECMO data was randomization. Yet this single 
omission was taken to be reason enough to demand a „proper‟, i.e. randomized, trial. As 
we shall see in a moment, such an insistence was highly questionable. As it turned out, 
the complex procedure eventually adopted for ECMO‟s RCT, carried out in the early 
1980s, resulted in 11 patients being assigned the ECMO treatment, who all survived, and 
one assigned the conventional treatment, who died (Bartlett et al 1985). Yet, despite this 
100 per cent 11-for-11 survival rate for ECMO, as compared, remember, to historical 
survival rates of only 20 per cent, still critics insisted the evidence was insufficient to 
prove ECMO‟s efficacy, because only one baby had been assigned the conventional 
treatment. 
 
Therefore another RCT was carried out, in the late 1980s. Nine babies received ECMO; 
all nine survived. Ten received conventional treatment, of whom six survived. At this 
stage, pre-specified criteria deemed the evidence sufficiently conclusive for the trial to be 
halted. A further 20 babies who arrived at trial centers suffering from PPHS were all 
assigned ECMO; 19 of those survived (O‟Rourke et al 1989). 
 
Finally, even after this second RCT some statisticians objected that the sample sizes were 
still too small for definitive conclusions. Amazingly, a third trial was begun in the UK. 
The result? It had to be stopped early because of too many deaths in the control group. 
 
Is randomization really necessary? 
The only virtue missing from the original ECMO data, recall, was randomization. But is 
randomization really so necessary? The case for it is well known. In particular, while we 
can arrange „by hand‟ for a treatment and control group to be equally balanced with 
respect to known possible confounders such as age and health, we obviously cannot 
balance by hand with respect to unknown confounders, precisely because they are 
unknown. If we allocate randomly, however, that automatically ensures there will be no 
systematic bias with respect to any confounder at all, known or unknown. 
 
However – return to that word „systematic‟. True enough, in the long run over many 
distributions, allocating patients randomly will ensure no systematic bias. But any one 
allocation might certainly turn out to be very biased indeed. For example, suppose age is 
important and that we randomly allocate 20 patients, ten young and ten old. Quite 
possibly, just by chance, we may end up with a treatment group of, say, eight young and 
two old, and a control group the other way round. (Such imbalances are especially likely 
with smaller sample sizes, and when there are many known confounds all needing to be 
balanced.) In such circumstances, the usual remedy is to re-randomize to get a better 
balance, a procedure known as „baseline rebalancing‟. Once we arrive at an allocation 
that is deemed sufficiently balanced with respect to all known factors, then a trial may go 
ahead. But if the only factors that are skewed are unknown ones, then we will have no 
way of recognizing the need for baseline rebalancing. In other words, in any particular 
case randomization provides no guarantee at all that we actually are balanced with 
respect to unknown factors, even though this is supposedly its unique advantage. 
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Compare balancing by hand instead. Known factors can obviously be allocated evenly 
that way; there is no need for randomization. With respect to unknown factors, 
meanwhile, there is no reason to expect a hand allocation to be any less balanced than a 
random one. If these unknown factors are correlated with any known ones, then the best 
we can do is balance with respect to the latter – and that is exactly what‟s done anyway.1 
 
The conclusion is that randomization in itself adds nothing (Worrall 2002, 2007).
2
 It 
might be objected that, be that as it may, in any case randomization does no harm either, 
assuming that any baseline rebalancing is performed thoroughly. But the real point is that 
the perception that randomization is necessary leads to the unjustified shunning of other 
forms of evidence. That was why, for instance, the dramatically heightened survival rates 
associated with the ECMO treatment were not thought decisive – even though there was 
no strong reason to think them the result of any of various known confounders. Only an 
unreasonable prejudice in favor of randomization for its own sake can explain why the 
existing ECMO evidence wasn‟t deemed sufficient. 
 
Conclusion 
To what extent, then, are RCTs necessary? Many times, they will indeed be the best 
evidence. But not always – other times, historical or observational trials may be equally 
or even more persuasive. Or, as with ECMO, the historical data should already be 
considered sufficient. Overall, there is no one-size-fits-all answer. Decisions must be 
made case by case. Whether it is indeed unethical to recruit participants for an RCT can 
therefore also only be assessed case by case. 
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